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Abstract 
This essay critically examines one of the dominant tendencies in recent theoretical discussions of 
anarchism, postanarchism, and argues that this tradition fails to engage sufficiently with 
anarchism’s history. Through an examination of late nineteenth-century anarchist political 
thought—as represented by one of its foremost exponents, Peter Kropotkin— we demonstrate 
the extent to which postanarchism has tended to oversimplify and misrepresent the historical 
tradition of anarchism. The article concludes by arguing that all political-theoretical discussions 
of anarchism going forward should begin with a fresh appraisal of the actual content of anarchist 
political thought, based on a rigorous analysis of its political, social, and cultural history. 
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(Or, Prolegomena to Any Future Anarchist Political Theory) 
I. Introduction 
In reflecting on the history of political philosophy in the twentieth century, it is notable that most 
of the individuals regarded as ‘great thinkers’— Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Max 
Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, 
Friedrich Hayek, Isaiah Berlin, John Rawls, Robert Nozick, etc.—were academics or, at the very 
least, recipients of advanced academic degrees. Although some of these thinkers, like Sartre and 
Foucault, were activists who wrote in the context of real-world political struggles, the larger 
share directed their work principally to the attention of their peers, that is, intellectuals and 
academics. By way of contrast, very few of the so-called ‘canonical’ thinkers of the classical 
anarchist movement, to say nothing of the thousands of anonymous individuals who participated 
in that movement, were college-educated, and next to none of them had advanced degrees or 
worked in universities. Many—like Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Emma Goldman, and Errico 
Malatesta—were autodidacts who would have considered themselves revolutionaries rather than 
intellectuals. Notwithstanding the polemics of Lenin and other Marxists, who frequently accused 
anarchists of being counterrevolutionaries and members of the ‘petty bourgeoisie’,1 most 
anarchist writings were not intended solely, or even principally, for middle-class intellectuals, 
and certainly not for academics; rather, they were addressed to the struggling masses and, more 
generally, to the persuadable reading public for the sake of advancing the revolutionary cause.  
 All of this may help to explain why anarchism has mostly been ignored or dismissed 
outright by political theorists and historians of philosophy. Because the ‘canonical’ writings of 
Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, and many others besides did not generally take the 
form of philosophical tomes, let alone peer-reviewed academic monographs,2 there has surely 
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been a tendency to dismiss them as mere ‘propaganda’ unworthy of serious consideration. The 
assumption being, which is obviously a product of the worst kind of intellectual snobbery and 
academic prejudice, is that credible political philosophy only emerges in elite institutional 
contexts. Pamphlets, tracts, editorials in revolutionary newspapers—these are not appropriate 
venues within which to articulate and defend serious philosophical ideas, or so it is implied. 
 Meanwhile the comparatively few scholars who have published significant historical and 
political-theoretical studies of anarchism have consistently represented anarchism as a single, 
uniform system of political thought knitted together piecemeal from the writings of a handful of 
‘canonical’ anarchist writers from the nineteenth century—most notably Proudhon, Bakunin, and 
Kropotkin. In this, they have merely followed a longstanding convention in the discipline of 
intellectual history, and especially in the history of philosophy, according to which 
comprehensive, self-contained systems of thought and practice are derived from the disparate 
writings of ‘great thinkers’.3 Although some political theorists and historians of political 
ideologies have grown increasingly skeptical of this narrow focus and have attempted to adopt a 
broader, more historically-informed approach in their own work, the study of anarchism has 
generally remained impervious to these methodological changes.4 The ‘canonical approach’ 
continues to reign supreme, the problem being that, at least in the case of anarchism, this fails to 
take into account the broader social, political, and cultural history of the anarchist movement 
and, by extension, the wide variety of sources, printed or otherwise, through which anarchist 
ideas were developed and disseminated.5   
 It should be emphasised that close readings of ‘canonical’ texts are not entirely without 
merit, provided that they are carried out with a finely-tuned sensitivity to the various contexts—
historical, political, social, cultural, etc.—within which these texts emerged. Ideally, such 
4 
 
exercises will be one component of a much more comprehensive strategy. Although anarchism 
can and should be examined as a form of political theory—or, more precisely, as a political-
theoretical tradition or orientation—anarchism is not and has never been merely a form of 
political theory. Rather, anarchism is a complex and dynamic social, political, and cultural 
movement whose history cannot be ascertained by studying the canon alone. Instead, it must be 
understood in light of the fullest possible range of anarchist ideas and practices reflected in the 
political and social history of anarchism, including, but not limited to, transnational anarchist 
print culture.  
 Saul Newman, Todd May, and other postanarchist writers6 have been taken to task many 
times over for their failure to engage sufficiently with this complex anarchist history.7 Although 
postanarchism is not the only political theoretical-tendency susceptible to this accusation,8 it is 
arguably the most influential and widely discussed,9 and for this reason deserves special 
attention. In our view, existing criticisms of postanarchism do not go far enough. The problem is 
not just that postanarchist theory relies inordinately on a small and unrepresentative group of 
thinkers, or that it imputes views to these thinkers which they did not actually hold, but that it 
lacks an adequate understanding of the wider intellectual and political context within which they 
were operating, and to which they were responding. Through an examination of the thought of 
Kropotkin, one of the foremost exponents of late nineteenth-century anarchism, we will 
demonstrate the extent to which the failure to read classical anarchism contextually produces 
significant distortions, oversimplifications, and misrepresentations. In doing so, we offer an 
initial invitation to political theorists—including, but not limited to, postanarchists—to begin a 
fresh appraisal of anarchist political thought based on a more careful and rigorous analysis of its 
history. 
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II. Anarchism, Ideology and Theory  
As countless writers have noted, anarchism is not a comprehensive, uniform, self-contained 
political philosophy, ideology, or system of thought. On the contrary, anarchist theory, to say 
nothing of anarchist practice, has always been marked by incredible diversity—so much, in fact, 
that it is difficult if not altogether impossible to provide a single definition of anarchism that 
applies with equal accuracy to all anarchists. A more helpful approach is offered by Michael 
Freeden, who has argued at length that political ideologies should not be viewed as fixed, 
invariable ‘belief systems’ so much as languages whose core concepts evolve and change over 
time. Freeden writes: 
As products, both political philosophy and ideology are genres of political thought that 
display strong similarities in their morphology and that may overlap considerably in 
many of their normative and recommendatory features… Traditionally, the exploration of 
political thought has been organized around the persons who have best expressed 
coherent political thinking, around the main overarching themes with which it has been 
concerned, around the formulation of philosophically valid political utterances, or around 
particular historical periods. But the basic units of thinking about politics are the concepts 
that constitute its main foci, just as words are the basic units of language, and… the 
argument is put forward that the analysis of political thought, as a scholarly enterprise 
related to the methodological interests of students of social phenomena, is most usefully 
promoted by proceeding from the conceptual morphologies it displays.10 
 
Freeden’s suggestion is that otherwise distinct political traditions may be seen as bearing a 
‘family resemblance’ to one another insofar as they share a kind of ‘DNA’—that is, core 
concepts—in common. For example, if both John Locke and Rawls can be meaningfully 
described as ‘liberals’, it is not because they subscribe to a common belief system, but because 
their theories share certain core concepts. We can make the same point about different kinds of 
anarchists: They are ‘anarchists’ because they belong to the same philosophical ‘family’.  
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 The difficulty comes in figuring out how the political-theoretical ‘DNA’ of the anarchist 
family is structured. As we noted in the introduction, the standard approach to this issue in both 
political theory and intellectual history has been to derive accounts of anarchist political theory 
from the writings of a handful of ‘canonical’ figures, a habit which, as noted, is especially 
evident in postanarchist political theory. At the highest level of generality, postanarchism may be 
defined as a current in anarchist political theory that is informed by and critically engages with 
poststructuralist philosophy. Within this current, we can identify, following Benjamin Franks, at 
least three specific orientations:  
First, a strident, Lyotardian Postanarchism, that rejects traditional anarchist concerns, and 
instead proposes the adoption of new critical approaches and tactics that lie beyond the 
remit of anarchist orthodoxy, using as their basis those poststructural theorists that are 
antipathetic to traditional anarchism. Second, a redemptive postanarchism that seeks the 
adoption into anarchism of poststructural theory to enrich and enliven exiting practices, 
one which sees ‘anarchism’ as it currently stands as lacking, but amenable to change. 
Third, and finally, a postmodern anarchism (which corresponds to the last version of 
post-Marxism), that reapplies anarchist analyses and methods to the new globalized, post-
Pruitt-Igoe political economy, and concentrates on the actions of oppressed subjects.11  
 
The second orientation, which is arguably the most prominent within the anarchist studies 
milieu, is chiefly associated with Newman and May. As Newman writes, for example, 
“[P]ostanarchism is not a transgression or a movement beyond the terms of anarchism… [rather] 
it seeks to destabilise the foundationalism on which the discourse of classical anarchism rests. Its 
deconstructive tools are poststructuralist thought and elements of psychoanalytic theory.”12 May 
adds: “Poststructuralist political theory replaces traditional anarchism’s a priori with, on the one 
hand, the positivity or creativity of power and, on the other, the idea that practices or groups of 
practices (rather than subject or structure) are the proper units of analysis.”13 
 Unlike other recent theoretical engagements with classical anarchism,14 postanarchism is 
a project that is self-consciously engaged with and responding to classical anarchism. As the 
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above quotations from Newman and May make clear, however, postanarchists believe that 
classical anarchism has significant shortcomings (e.g., essentialistic accounts of human nature, 
naively progressive views of history, a tendency to valorize the natural sciences, and so on) 
which can be remedied through an engagement with poststructuralist and psychoanalytic theory.  
Yet, despite the iconoclastic urge that underpins their challenge to the historical tradition of 
anarchism, adding nuance to this history has never been the postanarchists’ métier. Rather, 
mirroring the approach of mainstream political theory, postanarchists have been intent on fixing 
the contributions, and detailing the shortcomings, of classical anarchists, instead of examining 
the complexity of these ideas at the point of their articulation.  
 The failure of postanarchism to engage with the social and political history of the 
anarchist movement beyond the canon represents a deeper problem. Postanarchists have tended 
to derive their understanding of anarchist political theory almost entirely from the writings of 
canonical thinkers, allowing the latter to stand in as a monolithic expression or representation of 
the intellectual life of the classical anarchist movement. In so doing, postanarchism overlooks the 
depth and variety of anarchism’s intellectual history. As we noted above, however, even 
postanarchism’s reading of the canon is fraught, having been accused of oversimplifying or 
otherwise misrepresenting the ideas expressed in ‘canonical’ anarchist works (a significant 
accusation by itself, since the postanarchist project relies so heavily on identifying what it takes 
to be the shortcomings of classical anarchism). But how exactly does postanarchism gets these 
thinkers wrong? Much has already been said about what might be called “intratextual” problems 
of methodology—that is to say, problems with how parts of texts are interpreted in relation to the 
whole, or in relation to other writings by the same author. (Examples would include overly 
narrow or selective reading, the construction of strawman arguments, and so on.) Comparatively 
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less attention has been paid to the various ways in which postanarchist writers misunderstand or 
ignore the broader context within which classical anarchist ideas developed—for example, by 
failing to take into account their relationship to contemporaneous intellectual, political, and 
social controversies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is this problem that we 
discuss in this essay.  
 To be clear, we are not claiming that the general motives of the postanarchists are 
misguided. It is surely worthwhile to explore critically the strengths and limitations of classical 
anarchist political theory, especially within the context of recent and contemporary Continental 
thought. Doing so honestly and fruitfully, however, requires a more nuanced understanding of 
classical anarchist political theory, which in turn requires a sufficiently contextual approach to 
reading and interpreting anarchist texts. In the next section, we demonstrate how such an 
approach might work using selected writings from Kropotkin; who, as one of the most 
commonly discussed anarchist thinkers, and a key target of postanarchist critique, is a potent 
example when considering the shortcomings of recent theoretical appreciations of his work. Our 
hope going forward is that future political-theoretical discussions of anarchism will take 
inspiration from this example, and pursue more rigorous examinations of anarchist history.  
   
III. On Kropotkin: Science and the Substance of History  
 Like every political ideology, the ideas that have historically comprised anarchism are the 
product of debate and contestation. And, for any political doctrine to endure, these core ideas 
must necessarily possess enough flexibility for reapplication as tools of critique outside of the 
context of their immediate articulation. The contemporary resurgence of interest in anarchism 
demonstrates that, as with the ideologies that dominate political discourse, anarchist theory 
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displays an attendant level of intellectual pliability, inspiring critics and activists beyond the site 
of its historical development as a tradition in the nineteenth century. As much as political 
theorists look to the past, then, they also have an inbuilt desire to overcome their progenitors, and 
in this anarchism is a more Oedipal tradition than most. For postanarchists, surveying the field of 
anarchist history is both a source of inspiration and embarrassment. The pursuit of meaningful 
social freedom, secured through the overcoming of ‘hierarchical social relations,’ was the noble 
objective of anarchism’s foundational thinkers, but their projects of emancipation were weighed 
down by the historical baggage of their intellectual context.15 Forged in the afterglow of the 
European Enlightenment, the instinct for human liberation ran through the core of anarchism, but 
it also manifested its imperfections: an essentialised vision of humanity; a progressive theory of 
history; and an eschatological faith that the antagonisms of the present would find resolution. 
 For a number of reasons, Peter Kropotkin is frequently pinpointed as the exemplar of this 
mentality. While praising Kropotkin for his forceful articulation of federalism, or trenchant 
defence of voluntarism, post-anarchists insist that the wider assumptions of his social philosophy 
blunt the radical edge of this politics.16 Central to this objection is the argument that Kropotkin 
placed undue faith in the interpretative and emancipatory potential of the scientific method, an 
attachment leading him to make dubious translations from the natural to social sciences 
following in the footsteps of oppressively rationalistic thinkers like Auguste Comte. Snared by 
these intellectual debts and the historical context that legitimised them, Kropotkin is charged 
with committing a number of allied crimes. He based his analysis of humankind on a dubious 
‘conception of universal animal nature’, in turn positing the existence of an ‘essentially benign’ 
human nature that entailed an anodyne vision of a future free of coercion.17 This conception of 
humanity’s innate goodness, one perverted by the morality fostered by class society, also 
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engendered a faith in anarchism’s ultimate triumph. Prone to borrowing the language of 
scientific ‘laws’, Kropotkin advanced a theory of historical development that discerned an 
‘inexorable’ trajectory towards ‘emancipation’.18 In short, Kropotkin’s scientism is an 
embarrassing impediment: 
It is understandable that Kropotkin would wish to deploy the semiotics of modern 
science against capital and the state, for in his time, scientific analysis appeared to be 
capable of addressing any and all problems. But Kropotkin’s era was…followed by a 
century of instrumental reason run rampant, and it is for this reason that 
postmodernists such as Jean Baudrillard have argued that a rational, scientific 
language cannot possibly be used to articulate a truly radical politics.19  
   
Modernity, as Zygmunt Bauman noted, ‘is an age of artificial order and of grand societal 
designs, the era of planners, visionaries, and–more generally–‘gardeners’ who treat society as a 
virgin plot of land’.20 The politics of scientific rationalism led not to the fruit-tree lined streets of 
Henry George’s vision, or the ventilated mine shafts of Kropotkin’s imaginings, but to ossuaries 
and crematoria.21   
 The critique of Kropotkin’s work is therefore foundational to the postanarchist political 
identity, and his ambitions of rooting anarchist politics in the discourses of nineteenth century 
science an obvious foil for attempts of contemporary theorists to break out of the confines of a 
seemingly antiquated politics. Postanarchists have thus launched a robust critique of the 
historical anarchist tradition, which has posed many searching questions, but their evaluation has 
itself met stubborn opposition. It is worth noting, for instance that, post-structuralist patina aside, 
scepticism regarding the emancipatory potential and internal coherence of Kropotkin’s 
philosophy is not uncommon. Liberal political theorists like David Miller, and the historian of 
anarchism George Woodcock, both noted the conflict between Kropotkin’s apparent historicism 
and his commitment to revolution.22 Indeed Malatesta, the Italian anarchist who shared 
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Kropotkin’s exile in London, opposed his friend’s commitment to unveiling anarchism’s 
scientific basis. Rejecting the utility of the ‘mechanical concept’, he warned of the fatalistic 
implications for anarchist praxis: ‘everything is determined, inevitable, nothing can be other than 
what it is’.23  
 For the historian of political thought, it is also not necessarily post-structuralism to which 
they would turn for a critique of the potentially illiberal implications of political utopianism, but 
the dissection of the totalitarian temper advanced by thinkers like Isaiah Berlin, Karl Popper, and 
Leszek Kołakowski decades earlier.24 And more significantly, from Kropotkin to Marie-Louise 
Berneri and beyond, there is a rich history within the anarchist tradition of challenging the 
authoritarianism lurking in the shadows of the cities sketched by utopian dreamers.25 Even 
Kropotkin, the alleged doyen of mechanistic social science, winced at the lack of flexibility in 
Icarian colonies and Fourierian phalanesteries, dismissing their unduly optimistic vision of a 
communal life purged of conflict.26 As he insisted, offering a preface to Emile Pataud and Emile 
Pouget’s syndicalist utopia How We Shall Bring About the Revolution (1913), the future 
remained not only unwritten, but unwritable: ‘life is infinitely more complicated than anything 
that can be foreseen’.27  
 The failure of postanarchists to appreciate the complexity of Kropotkin’s thought stems 
partly from a broader lack of sensitivity to the history of anarchism, both as an historically 
constituted intellectual tradition and as a social movement. Kropotkin’s relationship to Charles 
Darwin is one example in which this absence of historical acuity is particularly apparent. Given 
that Darwin cast a long shadow over nineteenth-century letters, one that traversed disciplinary 
boundaries in being equally important to social thought, it is unsurprising that Kropotkin, 
interested in both natural and social philosophy, should respond to his ideas. While postanarchist 
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commentators tend to overlook the fact that Kropotkin was not offering a riposte to Darwin in 
Mutual Aid (1902) but protecting Darwinian theory from its perversion as a justification of 
narrow individualism, his deeper reading of evolutionary theory problematises the view of his 
narrow essentialism.28 As Newman and May argue, Kropotkin’s ‘theory of social relations’ 
rested on the idea of ‘an innate tendency towards mutual aid and assistance, something we have 
inherited from the animal world’, and therefore that ‘human beings have a nature or essence; 
and…that that essence is good or benign’.29 
 While this interpretation of Kropotkin’s Darwinism informs the charge that he held a 
naively progressive view of history, with the inevitable triumph of the tendency to sociality, in 
reality his evolutionary theory is more complex. Beyond the pages of Mutual Aid, Kropotkin 
wrote frequently about the importance of Darwin’s work, placing it at the apex of nineteenth-
century scientific achievement.30 Central to his perception of On the Origin of Species (1859) 
significance, however, was not that it pointed to the importance of cooperation in animal 
societies, but that it finally destroyed the idea of species’ immutability. Buffon, Linnaeus, and 
Lamarck had all pointed in this direction, but Darwin decisively revealed ‘the idea 
of…continuous development (evolution) and of a continual adaptation to changing 
environment’.31 While criticised for adopting a teleological view of history, Kropotkin cleaved to 
a Darwinian explanation of evolution that had itself been inspired by a rejection of the teleology 
of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, who looked to the direct adaptation of organisms to their environment 
as the motor of evolutionary change. As Darwin objected, this commitment to perfectibility 
struggled to explain the endurance of the ‘lowest forms’ of life: 
Lamarck, who believed in an innate and inevitable tendency towards perfection in all 
organic beings, seems to have felt this difficulty so strongly he was led to support 
that new and simple forms are continually…produced by spontaneous generation. 
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As Darwin countered, this was not a problem for ‘our theory’ of natural selection, as ‘natural 
selection…does not necessarily include progressive development—it only takes advantage of 
such variations as arise and are beneficial to each creature under its complex relations of life’.32 
Despite the confidence of his claim, before the rediscovery of Mendelian genetic theory in the 
early twentieth century, the line between Lamarckian and Darwinian explanations of evolution 
was a fine one. The debates between the proponents of either approach tended to generate more 
heat than light, and the divide between them was porous, with Darwin himself making 
concessions to direct adaptation. Following the completion of Mutual Aid, Kropotkin threw his 
energy into these technical discussions, emphasising Darwin’s latent Lamarckism, and thus the 
dual importance of direct adaptation and natural selection. 
Although Kropotkin’s interpretation of evolutionary inheritance is now outmoded, the 
important point to gather from his work, which included a polemical dissection of the arch-
Darwinian August Weismann, was his stress on constant modification as the principle of organic 
life. In 1912, for instance, Kropotkin published an essay summarising recent scientific 
researches, and concluded that the ‘hereditary transmission of acquired characters’ was 
increasingly being shown to be an axiom of organic evolution.33 Two-years later, as Kropotkin 
was losing face for supporting the Allies in the First World War, he published a further 
examination of inheritance in plants that reiterated the rapidity of change: 
Varied experiments [have shown] that changes which we formerly believed would 
require scores of years to be produced by a natural selection of accidental variations 
are obtained in the experimental field or the laboratory in the lifetime of the 
individual by a mere change of environment.34 
 
Indeed, so important was mutability that Kropotkin concluded that it was fundamental to 
evolutionary survival: 
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Variability, which Darwin described as a ‘handmaid to Natural Selection,’ offers to 
her lady such a profusion of variations that the lady’s preferences are determined 
beforehand. All that she has to do is to weed out those, probably sickly, individuals 
which are not plastic enough and do not answer rapidly enough the requirements of a 
changed environment by corresponding structural changes.35  
 
When writing to the botanist Joseph Hooker in 1844, long before he made his theory of evolution 
public, Darwin confided, with characteristic circumspection, that ‘I am almost convinced…that 
species are not…immutable…[and] I think I have found out…the simple way by which species 
become exquisitely adapted to various ends’. In the intellectual climate of the time, he added, 
this was ‘like confessing to a murder’.36 Kropotkin noted this observation with approval, as 
further evidence of Darwin’s revolutionary genius, as he demonstrated that ‘there are no 
immutable species: that all of them give birth to countless variations’.37  
 As postanarchists rightly suggest, Kropotkin drank deeply from the well of nineteenth 
century science, but their efforts to understand this debt have been impoverished by an absence 
of contextualisation. Lacking an appreciation of the wider intellectual context that informed the 
borrowing of concepts from the natural sciences in the late-Victorian period, they fail to 
appreciate the complexities and uniqueness of his thought. As towards the end of the century 
biology displaced physics as the science achieving the most profound discoveries, social 
theorists increasingly reached for organic analogies to buttress their interpretations of society.38 
Kropotkin followed suit, but for all the connections made between his scientism, essentialised 
view of humanity, and Panglossian confidence in the course of social development, the 
translation of evolutionary theory was heterogeneous, and rarely informed a simple narrative of 
steady progress. Even a thinker like Herbert Spencer, who enshrined evolutionary development 
at the heart of his grand intellectual system, insisted on the possibility of regression: 
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The cosmic process brings about retrogression as well as progression, where the 
conditions favour it. Only amid an infinity of modifications, adjusted to an infinity of 
changes of circumstances, do there now and then occur some which constitute an 
advance…Evolution does not imply a latent tendency to improve, everywhere in 
operation. There is no uniform ascent from lower to higher…only an occasional 
production of a form which, in virtue of greater fitness for more complex conditions, 
becomes capable of a longer life…What thus holds with organic types must hold also 
with types of societies.39  
 
Revealingly, Kropotkin was deeply indebted to Spencer’s work on evolutionary theory. But as 
much as Spencer recognised a potential for decline, for other thinkers the organicist model had 
implications that were more dramatic. The perceived morbidity of fin de siècle European thought 
derived in part from a sense that evolutionary theory could entail the opposite of progressive 
development, and to speak of society and history in organic terms opened the door to notions of 
decline, stagnation, and death. That this pervasive fear of ‘degeneration’ had sinister implications 
is well known.40 For a scientist like Karl Pearson, holder of the quickly renamed Galton Chair of 
Eugenics at University College London, ‘the doctrine of evolution’ unequivocally applied ‘to the 
history of nations’. The ‘continual progress of mankind’, he wrote in 1900, ‘is the scarcely 
recognized outcome of the bitter struggle of race with race, like all other life, being subject to the 
stern law of the survival of the fitter’. The ‘hecatombs of inferior races’ pave the ‘path of 
progress’, he added, and to flinch before this natural law would be a mistake, only leading the 
‘superior race…[to] degenerate itself’.41  
 Pearson’s comments reflected a broader sense of anxiety in certain European intellectual 
circles concerning, to borrow a phrase from a figure equally interested in eugenic ideas, the 
shape of things to come. Indeed, H.G. Wells’ depiction of the cannibalistic Morlocks preying on 
the effete Eloi in his The Time Machine was something of a warning, freighted as it was with the 
terminology of decline: 
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The too-perfect security of the Upper-worlders had led them to a slow movement of 
degeneration, to a general dwindling in size, strength, and intelligence…What had 
happened to the Under-grounders I did not yet suspect; but from what I had seen of 
the Morlocks….I could imagine that the modification of the human type was even 
more profound than among the ‘Eloi’.42 
 
The power of Wells’ novella, first published in 1895, stemmed from the purchase that these fears 
possessed. In 1894, for instance, another Cassandra of stagnation Benjamin Kidd had published 
his highly influential Social Evolution, and like Pearson’s intervention, pointed to competition as 
the engine of national progress: 
It is now coming to be recognized as a necessarily inherent part of the doctrine of 
evolution, that if the continual selection which is always going on amongst the higher 
forms of life were to be suspended, these forms would not only possess no tendency 
to make progress forwards, but must actually go backwards…That is to say…a 
process of slow but steady degeneration would ensure.43  
 
What is perhaps most surprising for modern readers is that Pearson, Wells, and Kidd were all 
men of the left. Pearson identified as a socialist, albeit of a ‘regimented’ kind, championing 
modern socialism’s efforts in helping to ‘leaven’ progressive legislation, and argued that ‘society 
ought to be one vast guild of laborers…and so organized there would be no place…for those who 
merely live on the work of others’.44 While obstinately refusing to join any group, Pearson kept 
abreast of events in London’s late-Victorian radical scene, and corresponded regularly with 
Charlotte Wilson, later a founder alongside Kropotkin, and first editor of, Freedom newspaper.45 
Kidd’s belief in the vivifying qualities of competition, on the other hand, might seem 
characteristic of an aggressive form of individualistic liberalism, but he also looked to a state led 
‘social enfranchisement’ building on the successes of political enfranchisement. Securing ‘equal 
social opportunities’ through state action was therefore central to his schema, meaning that he 
lay close to Fabianism—the influential socialist group founded in 1884 that looked to the gradual 
realisation of socialism through existing political agencies.46 The politically unorthodox Wells 
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lay even closer to the Fabians, joining them in 1903, although his membership only lasted last 
four years.47 Calling for a greater professionalisation of the Society, Wells looked beyond the 
Fabians’ paternalistic ‘Toryism’ to a technocratic elite that would shape social life.48 A ‘New 
Republic’ of ‘intelligently critical men [sic]’ would replace the ‘great swollen, shapeless, 
hypertrophied social mass of to-day’.49 
 All this may seem to cast little light on Kropotkin’s social thought, but in fact an 
appreciation of this intellectual context allows the modern reader to see the idiosyncrasies of his 
position, and the contextual commonalities, more clearly. All of these thinkers – Pearson, Wells, 
Kidd, and Kropotkin – shared a sense that degeneration and decline were discernible aspects of 
social development. Kropotkin differed in seeing the best way to address this in the expansion of 
mutual aid, rather than the institution of stern authority, but its real significance rests in what it 
demonstrates about his overarching vision of history and its commitment to a sense of decline, an 
appreciation which is wholly absent in postanarchist readings of his work. Given Pearson and 
Kidd’s renown, Kropotkin would certainly have been familiar with their understanding of 
retrogressive evolution. Pearson actually received a mention in one of Kropotkin’s follow-up 
articles to Mutual Aid, in which he praised his work in the statistical analysis of variability—
‘biometry’— and suggested that this new field of biology was inclining to confirm the limited 
evolutionary role of chance variation.50 He may have been unaware of Wells’ work, but Wells’ 
fame as a popular fiction writer and essayist further attests to the prominence of these tropes of 
degeneration in British intellectual life in this period. Moreover, Kropotkin was evidently 
anxious about where some of this rhetoric was tending. The First International Eugenics 
Congress held in London in July 1912 attracted delegates from around the world, and Kropotkin 
contributed a speech entitled ‘The Sterilization of the Unfit’, later published in both Freedom 
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and Emma Goldman’s Mother Earth. Praising the Italian economist Achille Loria who in a 
previous discussion had condemned the inherent elitism at work in the sterilisation debate, 
Kropotkin argued, in line with his broader theoretical work on evolution, that the proponents of 
restrictive measures were failing to appreciate ‘the influence of surroundings upon the soundness 
of what is transmitted by heredity’.51 Social renewal offered a better hope of improving ‘the 
germ plasm’ than ‘any amount of sterilization’, he added, suggesting that to ‘destroy the slums’ 
was a necessary first step. Nevertheless, despite being unpersuaded by the scientific value of 
eugenic theory, it is apparent that Kropotkin readily bought into the potential of social 
degeneration: 
The great question which we all have at heart [is] the prevention of the deterioration 
and the improvement of the human race by maintaining in purity the common stock 
of inheritance of mankind.52    
 
Not sterilisation but socialism was Kropotkin’s solution to this problem, and he chided 
enthusiasts of eugenics for failing to recognise the social roots of the issues they raised: illness, 
crime, and errant sexual behavior.  
 If Kropotkin’s evolutionary theory placed mutability at its heart, and he believed in the 
possibility of retrogression, it follows that the notion that he trusted in the ineluctable triumph of 
anarchism must be qualified. His understanding of this historical process, propounded notably in 
Mutual Aid and The State: Its Historic Role (1896) certainly does not support such a reading. 
Rather than steady progress, Kropotkin saw in history a simplistic clash of eternally antagonistic 
forces: a tendency to social cooperation and mutual aid, and a competing impulse to domination 
and egotism. The State closed by enshrining this narrative in a choice: 
Yes: death – or renewal! Either the State for ever, crushing individual and local life, 
taking over in all fields of human activity, bringing with it its wars and its domestic 
power struggles, its palace revolutions which replace…one tyrant by another, and 
19 
 
inevitably at the end of this development there is…death! Or the destruction of the 
State, and new life starting again in thousands of centers on principle of the lively 
initiative of the individual and groups and that of free agreement. The choice lies 
with you!53       
 
Kropotkin’s broader historical narrative stressed that often in history people had not opted for the 
‘choice’ of free agreement. The Roman state, for him the epitome of centralised control, grew to 
co-opt and supplant the communal institutions created in the ‘societies, bands, or tribes’ that had 
made life possible for early humans.54 In turn, reflecting the penchant for medieval craft labor 
amongst early socialists, Kropotkin saw in the European communal movement a bold affirmation 
of individual liberty against the pretty-despotisms of the Dark Age.55 So too, in the streets of the 
city-states, he discerned cooperative institutions that provided a base for energetic intellectual 
enquiry, enabling scientific discoveries and artistic achievements. But these liberties were also 
precarious, and from the sixteenth century he saw the modern state exploiting internal 
weaknesses to rise from the rubble of these walled cities.56 More than ever before, the state 
absorbed ‘all social functions,’ and nurtured a ‘narrow-minded individualism’ as obligations to 
the state replaced the bonds of fellowship.57 Yet, ever the optimist, Kropotkin believed that this 
spirit of mutual aid had not been obliterated, and as much as this Goliath trampled social 
solidarity, shoots of resistance sprouted between its toes. 
 While unsophisticated, Kropotkin’s historical narrative, built as it is upon his reading of 
evolutionary theory, eschews any simple idea of steady progress. In arriving at this theory of 
historical development he was, as with every thinker, engaged in a conversation with the 
concerns and current fashions characterising the contemporary intellectual climate. These debts 
and dialogues are vital in fathoming the distinct contribution a thinker like Kropotkin was hoping 
to make to the history of anarchist ideas, and the act of contextulisation adds nuance to theories 
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and concepts that have tended to become streamlined as they promenaded across the page in 
general textbooks of political thought from the mid-twentieth century. This much is clear in 
appreciating the multifaceted debates concerning evolutionary theory, and Kropotkin’s efforts to 
reach his own comprehension of evolution in contrast – but also in certain respects in accordance 
with – other scholars grappling with the issue. Such a focus uncovers both the simplicity of 
appreciations of his position on evolution, which is not unique to postanarchist critics, and the 
utility of the historical gaze in comprehending past ideas. The notion of decline at the heart of 
Kropotkin’s historical theory further demonstrates that while he is assailed for offering a 
narrowly progressive and teleological interpretation of the historical record, the reality is more 
complex. Contextualising his evolutionary theory betrays the particularity of the postanarchist 
reading of his work in this regard, and looking to the actual practice of history, as it developed as 
self-conscious discipline in the nineteenth century, further reveals the tendency to paint an 
unsophisticated picture of the period’s intellectual history.   
 Kropotkin’s turn to historical narrative as an explanatory device – and an historical sense 
pervaded his entire philosophy – was itself a vital comment on the importance of history in his 
late-Victorian context. The Whig historians that had turned to historical investigation to trace the 
path of English exceptionalism certainly thought so, and the fact that Sir Edward Creasy’s A 
Text-Book of the Constitution (1848) went through sixteen print-runs in the nineteenth century, 
and that the first volumes of Thomas Babington Macauley’s History of England (1848) were 
instant bestsellers, suggests that this was an idea with a popular purchase.58 But while the 
‘Victorians plundered the past for the raw stuff of imagination’ and history became the ‘mainstay 
of meaningfulness’ in an increasingly secular intellectual climate, Kropotkin’s take on history 
abjured the celebration of the modern nation-state that was a prime concern of these historians.59 
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Indeed, the selective vision of the discipline of history was a regular recipient of his ire. Noting 
this Victorian tendency to celebrate the state, Kropotkin wrote that a change was underway 
whereby history, ‘after having been the history of kingdoms tends to become the history of 
nations and then the study of individuals’, which he interpreted as an interest in the ‘the 
members’ of a nation, rather than a Carlylean celebration of genius.60 Elsewhere, he reflected on 
the difficulty for even the ‘best-intentioned’ historian to provide a real picture of the past, given 
institutional impediments and archival biases: 
In our own time, the cumbersome records which we prepare for the future historian, 
in our Press, our laws courts, our Government offices, and even in our fiction and 
poetry, suffer from…one-sidedness. They hand down to posterity the most minute 
descriptions of every war, every battle…and act of violence…Ere long history will 
have to be re-written.61  
 
To his mind, a different, more complex, history was needed. This history would not fixate 
on the modern state or humanity’s sanguinary history, but look instead to understand the 
creative genius of historical communities that had struggled to survive against the odds, 
and the extra-state institutions they had established to make life livable.  
History’s disciplinary history therefore forms an important context in understanding 
Kropotkin’s interest in the past in the first place, and shows why he felt a pressing need to 
counter the fetish of the state beyond the boundaries of the narrowly political. Yet history’s 
history in Britain shaped Kropotkin’s efforts in other ways too. While Napoleon’s defeat 
‘proved the perfection of the British constitution’ to the Whiggish onlooker, the country’s 
faltering imperial project at the end of the century, against a backdrop of ratcheting 
imperial competition and national humiliations like the ‘Second Anglo-Afghan War, the 
Zulu Wars, the conflict with the Mahdi, [and] the Boer War’, meant that history became 
instructive in a different way.62 Amidst anxieties about British imperial decline and the 
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broader fear of degeneration considered above, historians became fascinated with the 
history of collapsing Empires. The ‘specter of decline’ that haunted Edward Gibbon’s opus 
History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776), influenced a number of 
popular nineteenth-century historians, including John Robert Seeley, Thomas Dyer, 
Thomas Keightley, and Theodore Mommsen. All were preoccupied with the fraying 
threads of classical power, identifying a range of causes as responsible, from militarist 
usurpation of liberty, to endemic venality, to a loss of civic virtue.63 Kropotkin diverged in 
seeing this collapse as no bad thing, but the point is that his own historical narrative 
adopted a similar logic. His vision of history was not Gibbonian in the sense that 
Kropotkin saw history as a struggle between contending forces as opposed to a cyclical 
process, but overriding these differences was a fascination in the course and manifestation 
of societies’ rise, decline, and disintegration. As much as the histories of Dyer or Keightley 
occasioned soul-searching in the corridors of the Colonial Office that Kropotkin would not 
have shared, his attempt to grasp the way in which history unfolded bore the imprint of 
these contemporary foci, refracted though a different lens. The promise of anarchism was 
meaningful freedom, but the lesson of history, shown in the demise of the village 
community and medieval commune, was that relative liberties were always vulnerable, and 
imperiled by inactivity. 
 Placing Kropotkin’s theory of evolution in historical context reveals the risks involved 
when painting nineteenth century intellectual history with a broad brush. Indeed, in the 
postanarchist critique it often seems that there is a too-ready tendency to perceive this history in 
categorical terms: the eighteenth-century Enlightenment superseded by nineteenth century 
positivism, followed by twentieth-century critical theory and then post-structuralist iconoclasm. 
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The reality is, of course, as useful as these categories can be, they frequently fail to capture the 
complexity of historical actors’ intellectual commitments. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, entombed in 
the Panthéon in recognition of his influence on France’s experiment in constructing a rational 
political culture was also one of the Enlightenment’s first critics, and Sigmund Freud, the grand 
diagnostician of the irrational impulses lurking behind the veil, remained an apostle of the 
scientific method.64 Kropotkin’s thought is similarly replete with these subtleties and 
antagonisms, and to appreciate it in anything but caricature, sensitivity to the context of its 
articulation is vital. Comte, Spencer, and Darwin were all fundamental influences on his thought, 
and he persistently discussed his politics in the language of contemporary science, but it is 
insufficient to see Kropotkin solely in terms of the ‘cult of positivism.’ While those reacting to 
this ‘travestied’ manifestation of Enlightenment values at the start of the twentieth century were 
condemning the mechanistic thinking of this tradition, Kropotkin was developing an ontology of 
continual change, perpetual antagonism, and temporary equilibrium.65 As Darwin and Lamarck 
had shown, as human history testified, and as modern physics was revealing, any ‘adjustment 
will only last under one condition: that of being continually modified; of representing at every 
moment the resultant of all conflicting actions’.66 Rather than an enervating determinism, it was 
this vision that Kropotkin hoped to enshrine in his politics.  
    
IV. Conclusion: Political Theory and History 
It is easy to imagine the resigned sigh that might meet the call for theorists of anarchism to pay 
closer attention to the history of the movement and its ideas. Many would no doubt object to the 
Gradgrindian implications of this suggestion, and conjuring an image of the Victorian 
schoolmaster declaiming on the principal battles of the Peloponnesian War through a cloud of 
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chalk dust, argue that the radicalism of any future political theory would be blunted by our 
sententious demand to learn the facts of history. Yet this would misunderstand both the 
ambitions of history as a discipline, and our object in insisting that this history is worth thinking 
about seriously.  
 As E.H. Carr noted long ago, when pondering that awkward question What is History? 
(1961), appeals to the sovereignty of facts is not enough. ‘To praise a historian for his accuracy,’ 
he wrote, ‘is like praising an architect for using well seasoned timber…It is a necessary condition 
of his work, but not his essential function’.67 To mimic Proudhon or Foucault, a more accurate 
appraisal of the historian’s role, therefore, is to question, uncover, complicate, challenge, nuance, 
clarify, explain, and connect. And for those interested in the history of ideas, their duty, as much 
as is possible, is to reveal past thought in all its detail and complexity; to uncover the reasons 
why diverse historical actors cleave to certain sets of ideas as useful tools of analysis for their 
present, and consider how these ideas emerge in response to the pressing questions of the day. 
 It follows then that any future political theory will necessarily be engaged in a 
conversation with the past, and for this theory to be a robust analysis of the present, it must 
appreciate the intricacies of this past. As the foregoing discussion of Kropotkin has suggested, 
perhaps viewing him as the purveyor of a mechanistic social science is not a sufficient appraisal 
of the ideas that defined his life. Sensitivity to the context that gave his ideas meaning in the first 
place shows that many nineteenth century assumptions and intellectual fashions shaped his 
thought, and understanding these allows a fuller appreciation of his political commitments. 
Further, it also stresses the notion that anarchism is a lived tradition that emerged through a 
constant process of reshaping and rethinking. This constant quest to articulate and rearticulate 
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anarchism’s claims not only involved anarchists debating amongst each other, but also demanded 
engaging with other traditions and other thinkers.    
 We have styled the foregoing analysis a ‘prolegomena’ because it is an invitation to 
further political-theoretical work that takes the intellectual history of anarchism seriously. This 
is, however, only a beginning. In order to achieve a wide enough scope, political theorists will 
also have to engage with its social and cultural history. Recent scholarship in anarchist 
historiography has broadened the horizons of this neglected past as never before, and provided us 
with a much fuller and richer understanding of the complex development of anarchism as a 
tradition of radical critique in the nineteenth century.68 Among other things, it has revealed the 
ways in which anarchist ideas emerged from, and were disseminated through, intricate 
transnational networks of communication, as well as via personal and organisational 
relationships.69 A diverse array of ‘newspapers, books of poetry, theater scripts, art, and political 
polemics’ percolated through these networks, carrying anarchist ideas across the globe, to be 
reimagined in fresh national contexts.70 As ideas were transmitted from one node to another, they 
were adapted and modified to meet the specific challenges facing activists and thinkers in these 
countries, and translated—both literally and figuratively—into prevailing cultural scripts. The 
ephemera of this movement, its books, but also its pamphlets, periodicals, and posters, leave 
echoes of this rich, fragmented, history.  
 To view anarchism, as many political theorists implicitly tend to do, as the invention of a 
select group of ‘great men’ is also reductive. Whatever the significance of Proudhon, Bakunin, 
and Kropotkin as the pioneers and tabulators of anarchist philosophy, the multifarious ways in 
which these ideas were rethought in diverse intellectual and cultural contexts, represents the 
lived history of this movement. The ink-smudged paper leaving the desks of a Kropotkin or 
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Bakunin for the typesetter and printer was intended to inspire, invigorate, and inflame. This 
reemphasizes the fact that anarchism as a movement marshalled its intellectual and cultural 
production in the service of revolutionary transformation, and sensitivity to the reception of these 
ideas is therefore crucial.  
We hasten to emphasise, however, that the study of ‘canonical’ thinkers should not be 
neglected as part of an overall strategy for understanding and appreciating classical anarchist 
ideas. Just as awareness of the reception of these ideas casts fresh light on their role in inspiring 
diverse actors, political theorists are obliged to treat the context of their articulation with greater 
care. For a self-consciously revolutionary tradition, it is axiomatic that anarchists did not simply 
talk amongst themselves, and just as anarchists tried to reach out to others, contemporary 
concerns made their imprint on anarchist theory. The foregoing discussion of Kropotkin’s ideas 
points at just one instance where greater sensitivity to the broader context complicates prevailing 
assumptions about the nature of his intellectual contribution. This prolegomena is therefore also 
a call: for political theorists interested in anarchism to scrutinise the nuances and ambiguities of 
this past. Such a conversation will enliven both disciplines, while simultaneously recovering a 
neglected history from obscurity. Through the chalk dust, even this much is clear. 
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